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BOOK REVIEW
Dale Arthur Oesterle *
LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE:

CORPORATE AND

CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE

U.S.A.

R. Buxbaum & K. Hopt. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988. Pp. 347, includes
biography and index. Cloth, -.
When six nation states in Western Europe ("Member States")
signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community (now known as European Community or EC), they envisioned the

development of a Common Market.' In the Common Market, all
"obstacles to freedom of movement for person, services and capital"
among the Member States were to be abolished. 2 The signatories
believed that a properly functioning Common Market would lead to a
continuous and balanced economic expansion in the Community, an
increase in economic stability within the Community, an accelerated
increase in the standard of living for citizens in the Member States, and
better relations between these States. 3 In 1987, the Community, now
consisting of twelve Member States, agreed to establish a fully inte4
grated "internal market" by 1992.
The Member States, however, have numerous and fundamental differences in their company and capital market laws (more often referred
to in this country as corporate and securities laws). These differences
run the gamut. Regulations on company finance, internal structure, disclosure obligations, and securities traders fluctuate widely from one
nation to the next. Some of the differences are technical, resting on
pragmatic disagreements. For example, are two-tier boards of directors,
separating supervisory from management directors, preferable to onetier boards in keeping managers loyal to shareholder interests? 5 Other
differences reflect disparate political choices about socio-economic systems and rest on deeply felt emotion and ideology. An example is the
divergent laws of the Member States on the subject of whether workers
should have representation on corporate boards. 6
Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 Mar. 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 2 [hererinafter "EEC Treaty"].
2. EEC Treaty, id. at art. 3(c).
3. EEC Treaty, id. at art. 2.
4. EEC Treaty, id. at art. 8A.
5. Germany requires two-tiered boards; firms in France may choose either; and
English firms have one-tiered boards.
6. Germany has the strongest form of worker codetermination, requiring equal
representation of labor and capital interest on a supervisory board that oversees the
22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 269 (1989)
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The signers of the EEC Treaty recognized that some harmonization
of the company and capital market laws of the Member States might be
necessary to the eventual success of the Common Market. Article
54( 3 )(g) of the Treaty provides for the approximation of company and
capital laws "to the necessary extent."' 7 The thorny questions before the
EC Commission then are: first, to what extent ought the European
Community harmonize the company and capital market laws of the
Member States; second, assuming the EC decides that a particular type
of regulation need be uniform in the Community, which version is preferable; and third, what process ought the EC use to coax (or force)
Member States into accepting the preferred rule.
Unfortunately, the Commission has not yet risen to the task. Its
infrequent and disjointed directives and proposals for company and capital market law harmonization exhibit a total lack of theoretical connection and sophistication. 8 This conceptual void led Professors Richard
Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, in their book Legal Harmonization and the
Business Enterprise: Corporateand Capital Mfarket Law Harmonization Polic'y in
Europe and the U.S.A., 9 to grapple directly with the hard questions
avoided by the Commission. Sifting through economic and political theory and the history of the federalist experience in America, the authors
search for criteria that could aid a rational division of power between the
Community and its Member States in company and capital market
regulation.
The authors' normative conclusions on the basic questions are limited to a mild suggestion that the Community should take firmer steps to
instruct Member States through legislation' 0 and court decisions.' 1
The book contains no particularized conclusions on how much harmonization is necessary to the creation of a common market nor on what the
content of the Community-wide rules ought to be. It matters not. I
thoroughly enjoyed the book. The strength of the book lies not in its
prescriptions, but in its delightful journey through the arguments and in
management board. Other Member States have a variety of weaker forms of worker
participation and some have no such rules.
7. Article 54 (3)(g) is a specific application of the more general Article 3(h),
which calls for "the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent
required for the proper functioning of the common market." See also Article 100
(approximation is to be pursued only with respect to laws that "directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market") and Article 100A (omitting
such a limitation on the harmonization of laws for the purpose of achieving the
"internal market").
8. The Commission has adopted eight formal Directives on company law harmonization and nine directives relating to capital market laws.
9. R. Buxbaum & K. Hopt, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND

THE U.S.A. (1988) [hereinafter LEGAL

HARMONIZATION].

10. The Commission could base Community regulations under Article 235.
11. The European Court ofJustice, under EEC Article 177, can, if properly asked.
interpret Commission directives and clarify whether a Member State's laws are
inconsistent.
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2
its sober predictions of future events.'
Chapter Two contains a cogent summary of the "American Experience." Detailing our mixed system of federal and state regulation of
company and capital market issues, we are encouraged to wonder
whether the EC could adopt a similar balance. We rely on state control
over our company laws and on federal control over our capital market
laws. But our reliance in each case is not exclusive. Federal regulation
of company law comes in the form of proxy, tender offer, and fraud provisions of federal securities acts, and in implementing regulations of a
federal agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission. State regulation of the capital markets comes in the form of state blue sky laws (and,
perhaps, some aspects of state banking laws).
States regulate company law through corporate codes that control
the internal affairs of firms. With the exception of some provisions in
the New York and California corporate codes, 13 American firms can
choose which state's law will apply to them by filing incorporation
papers in the locale of their choice. There are no requirements that a
firm have its principal office, a significant number of shareholders, or
even substantial assets in its state of incorporation.
The authors believe that state codes have become substantially similar; our reliance on state regulation has led to "harmonization from
below." States, competing for charters, imitate those states that appear
to have the best success in attracting incorporations. Moreover, states
were not hesitant to rely on a model act drafted by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association. The claim that state
codes are largely similar may strike an American corporate law teacher
as overbroad (can we say that California's code is similar to Delaware's
code?), but is surely correct in the sense that our state codes look closely
related when compared with the various company laws of the individual
Member States in the EC.
Will Member States of the EC, if left with the power to regulate
company law without substantial Community interference, follow a similar path to substantial uniformity? The authors answer in the negative.
First, most Member States require a firm to incorporate not in the
nation of their choice but rather in the nation that contains the firm's
headquarters (the siege social). This severely restricts (although it does
not eliminate) 14 competition among nations for firm incorporations and

12. Indeed, the authors' restraint is welcome in a time when legal writing is dominated by strident advocacy of position. These authors are scholars in the true sense

of the term.
13. New York and California have chosen to require "pseudo-foreign" corporations (corporations that carry on most of their business in state but are incorporated
out of state), to adhere to a few select provisions in their corporate codes. See Cal.
Corp. Code § 2115 (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1217-1220 (McKinney

1986).
14. Firms can relocate corporate headquarters, but at some cost. Moreover, as
long as the Member States do not restrict the flow of capital, investors can still

choose among corporations based on the soundness of national regulations.
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is unlikely to change. Member States have shown deep displeasure
whenever local firms claim a foreign seat. There is wide acceptance in
the EC of the view that the seige theory proyides more effective control
of large firms than the incorporation system used in the United States,
5
which allows states to export the weakest law.'
Second, the authors conclude that there is a "stickiness problem
because of the need to revamp Member State legislation to a degree not
required" at any single point in time in the evolution of the American
conventions. 16 For a single convention to develop, some Member
States must suffer a radical change in their legislation, a change that will
gore those entrenched interests tied to the perpetuation of the old systems. Lawyers and accountants in obsolete systems, for example, will
lose the value of their expertise. Moreover, some differences, such as
those over the rights of workers to participate in management, have
deep political roots.
If harmonization from below seems impractical, can the EC itself
legislate harmonization from above? The authors carefully detail the
Treaty provisions and Community institutions that give ample room for
political directives from the Community, but note, somewhat sadly, that
the Community has shown excessive temerity on the matter. The Community has relied on directives rather than regulations to protect the
sovereignty of the Member States. Directives apply to the states as
states and regulations establish rights and duties among individuals
within states. The EC, through a directive, asks that each state pass legislation transforming the directive into local law. The process, however,
has bogged down in practice. The EC has found it politically comfortable to issue directives that contain the lowest common denomination of
15. Europeans do not accept the arguments of Winter and others that claim our
competition among states produces the most efficient codes. See, e.g., Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theoy of Corporation, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
See also Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J. L., EcON. &
ORG. 225 (1985).
The authors argue that even in theory, the Winter argument is unhelpful because it

assumes a pre-existing formal division of powers in a federal system, a division
dependent on political variables. The authors suggest that if the EC relied exclusively on Member State competition to set EC law that social pressure for some kinds
of public law protection would develop and would lead the federal authority to act.
But if the federal authority was initially denied such authority for political reasons, it
would not become more politically acceptable as a result of simple expedience. In
other words, a system of competition in laws assumes some basic division of powers
between federal and member units based on tacit political variables. The authors
conclude that the Winter thesis is empirically suspect.
The pressure that each state in the American constellation felt to "go Delaware" was a pressure caused not by the economic realities postulated by the
public choice theory, buy by a legal, paradoxically perhaps even a federal
level legal doctrine... That alone renders the evidence of the American harmonization experience useless to prove, though it does not necessarily disprove, the public choice hypothesis. Minor franchise tax revenues may have
tempted a West Virginia, but hardly a New York.
LEGAL HARMONIZATION, supra note 9, at 274.
16. Id. at 277.
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the national laws and then permit individual Member States a multiplicity of "options."' 17 The options are designed to enable each of the
Member States to save most of its pre-existing laws. Moreover, there
are long-term lapses between the adoption of a directive and corroborative Member State legislation. The authors conclude that harmonization
through Community directives and the like will be continuous but slow
and fragmented.
At this point one ought to ask whether the EC has simply overplayed the importance of company and capital market law harmonization. Perhaps the Common Market can function effectively without
harmonization in these areas as long as a few critical norms (no
restraints on the travel of people, goods, or capital through tariffs or
other restrictions; no government subsidies to local firms; no cartels or
monopolies; and no market restrictions through government regulation
of product features or quantities) are recognized.
The authors briefly discuss and largely dismiss views critical of the
18
I
EC assumption that harmonization of company law is necessary.
give
authors
The
issues.
would have enjoyed a fuller treatment of these
us only two paragraphs on whether shareholder/creditor interests are
better served by harmonized Member State codes or by the existing system of Member State regulation. In these paragraphs they do not discuss the ability of investors to protect themselves by discounting the
price of their investments for inferior national regulation, let alone the
difference between the positions of shareholders and creditors as
investors.
The market power of investors, at a time when money knows no
national boundaries and can travel around the world in a matter of
seconds, will have major effects on the regulations adopted by Member
States and by the EC as well. We have only to look at Great Britain's
deregulation of its London stock exchange for a dramatic illustration of
these influences.
Moreover, there is only a single off-handed reference to the
Eurobond market, a trading system developed within existing regulations by the international investment community to tap capital resources
in Europe. Eurobonds avoid some of the problems associated with multiple currencies among European nations because they are denominated
by one currency, usually dollars (sometimes in yens or marks), wherever
sold in the EC. The strength of the market comes from the ability of
issuers to avoid national controls. Since the market is neither heavily
regulated nor heavily taxed, it is very popular with foreign subsidiaries
of American firms, for example, who seek to avoid United States securities, tax and foreign investment regulations. In other words, American
firms find that they often can raise capital in the Eurobond market at
17. The Fourth Directive allows for 41 options to Member States and 35 options
to firms themselves. Id. at 235.
18. Id. at 198-204.
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cheaper interest rates than they would have to pay on Wall Street. European issuers also use the market, which is essentially a negotiated placement system and not a public offering, to avoid the heavy capital market
controls among Member States. In short, the Eurobond market is an apt
illustration of the ability of investors to avoid heavy national regulations.
The value of the book for American readers lies in the book's power
to stimulate self-inspection. When authors ask whether the American
system it can provide a model or even lessons for the struggles of the EC
in its harmonization efforts, we inevitably question the wisdom of our
system, and in a very revealing and novel light. The chapter on the
American experience is excellent. It is concise and accurate in its
description of the evolution and current state of federalism in this country and I recommend it to anyone looking for single treatment overview
of the subject. Moreover, the chapter is provocative in its criticism of
the "near-legislative autonomy" of the Supreme Court1 9 in pushing an
outmoded concept of classical economics.
[The) Court's present only partly reflective display of a powerful and single-minded laissez-faire philosophy ... is beginning to drift out of line
from the less coherent and politically more
adaptive philosophy at work
20
in the legislature and in society at large.
The authors admit that classical economics may occupy the field simply
because no clear opposing doctrinal vision is available. 2 1 Nevertheless,
they hope one will develop that is more sensitive to the interplay
between legal doctrine and political values.
The chapter on the American experience focuses, as it should, on
the current debate over state legislation affecting tender offers, aimed
principally at out of state purchasers. Using the Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute in 198222 and upheld an
Indiana statute in 1987,23 holding the former was inconsistent with the
interstate market while the latter was not. The authors join the rest of
the academic community in struggling to find a rational basis for distinguishing the two statutes and in anticipating the cases' effect on other
areas of corporate law. 24 Meanwhile, states continue to flood their
books with a wide variety of protective legislation that essentially takes
value away from firm shareholders (and the economy in general) and
gives it to firm managers, workers, and local political officials. 2,5 This
type of state regulation, perhaps more than any other recently, demonstrates the dangers inherent in a system of localized regulation.
19.

LEGAL HARMONIZATION, supra note 9, at 164.

20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 164.
22. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
23. Edgar v MITE Corporation, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
24. One of the authors also has published an article on the matter. Buxbaum. The
Threatened Constitntionalizationof the InternalAffairs Doctrine in CorporationLaw, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 29 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Oesterle, The Effect of Statntes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability on

Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. RE%,. 31 (1989).
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Unfortunately, the authors wrote the book before much of the modern state anti-takeover legislation had developed. As a consequence
perhaps, there is little discussion of anti-takeover sentiment in Europe in
the following chapters, although it clearly exists. Moreover, there is little discussion of how Europeans view or ought to view the American
experience on the subject.
American tender offer regulation also demonstrates the dangers of
regulation from above. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission") simply cannot resist pushing the outer edges of its
jurisdictional grant. It has simply recast congressional legislation in a
form more suitable to its liking.2 6 The agency also increasingly
encroaches on State autonomy. The best recent example is new Rule
19c-4. The rule under the guise of the Commission's authority to oversee our national exchanges, prohibits (with some exceptions) the creation of dual class voting stock in our largest firms. The definition of
stock voting rights has long been a province of our state legislatures.
Indeed, the Indiana statute that the Supreme Court approved as within
the province of the states did no more than delimit share voting rights in
the context of takeovers.
The Commission recognized that firms were using dual class stock
to erect near perfect takeover defenses. At issue then is whether state
regulation of takeovers, whatever its form, is appropriate. The Commission, failing in its attempts to convince first the Supreme Court and then
Congress to preempt all state regulation of takeovers, is doing piecemeal what it could not do directly-intercede in the state regulation of
takeovers. Presumably the Commission could use a similar justification-its supervisory powers over our exchanges for prohibiting all companies on national exchanges from using share purchase rights plans
(known as poison pills).
The sad lesson from the American experience is that both sides, the
federal government and the states, seem to stretch to misuse whatever
authority they have. States, given room to maneuver by the Supreme
Court in CTS Corporationv. Dynamics, are passing abhorrent legislation at
the edges of the CTS doctrine and beyond and will continue to do so
until the Court speaks again with specificity to the new provisions. The
SEC, given room to maneuver by Congress in the form of provisions
deferring to its expertise, is pushing past sensible limits in the name of
protecting all of us innocents in the market. 27 The total effect of this
rapacious behavior is almost absolute deference to our federal courts to
set the balance when, by piecemeal decisions, the courts permit or stop
the transgressions. Well, as the authors imply in their book, the Europeans have always thought we have become overly dependent on our
26. The Commission has completely changed the statutory structure for registration of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and for tender offers under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
27. Many of the players do not wish to be so protected.

276
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courts in the way an addict must depend on heroin or a smoker on nicotine. Perhaps they are right.

BOOK REVIEW
Stephanie J. Mitchell*
R. Randle Edwards, Louis
University Press,
Columbia
York:
New
J..
Nathan.
&
Andrew
Henkin,
1986. Pp. 164. Cloth, $12.50.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA.

This brief book is a study in contrasts: as the fruit of a three-year
discussion of the subject among the authors, it is disappointingly brief,
with but 164 pages of text. The four essays comprising the book range
from the frustratingly vague to the insightful and specific. The chief distinction of Human Rights in Contemporary China1 is the place it assumes in
the literature in the field. As a glance at the two-and-one-half page bibliography suggests, there is very little written about the subject of human
rights in modem China, whether in English or Chinese. Certainly there
is no one book, other than this one, which attempts a survey of the historical development of concepts of human rights in China and a comparison of the present human rights situation there with international
norms.
Human Rights begins somewhat inauspiciously with a brief essay by
Louis Henkin entitled "The Human Rights Idea in Contemporary
China: A Comparative Perspective." It is not clear for what audience
this essay was intended, as both "China hands" and human rights specialists are likely to find it wanting. It analyzes Chinese history and politics in sweeping generalizations, 2 likely to frustrate China specialists,
and provides scant support for the conclusion that China "is deficient in
important ways in respect of human rights" and that "[t]here has been
insufficient effort either inside or outside China to persuade the Chinese
authorities of the societal usefulness of rights."'3 The West does not fare
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce. A.B., Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1978; J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 1980. Ms. Mitchell was the resident attorney in Beijing, China,

for a U.S. law firm in 1985 and 1986. The views expressed in this review are those of
the author in her individual capacity, and do not represent those of the Department

of Commerce or the United States Government.
1. Hereinafter Human Rights.
2. Such generalizations include references to "traditional" China, veiling distinctions between schools of philosophy and compressing thousands of years of history into a homogeneous blur. This homogeneous entity is depicted as having room

for "no confrontation between the individual and society," id. at 21, and is summarized in one page. It is followed by a rambling outline of the written provisions of the
1982 Chinese Constitution, which is used as the primary reference for the present
state of human rights in both theory and practice. This approach to both past and
present leaves far too many questions not only unanswered, but not even raised.

3. Id. at 34.
22
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much better. The essay glosses over discrepancies between aspirations
and reality in the West as well, 4 relying more on generalities and a vague
liberal philosophy than on clearly articulated standards. While the
reader may be assumed to understand the frame of reference used
regarding conditions in the United States, such broad statements naturally engender skepticism about the entire analytical framework being
applied to China. 5 With little in the way of specific evidence supplied to
support conclusions about the Chinese human rights situation, whether
historically or in the present, a reader without independent access to
such evidence must either doubt the author's conclusions or accept
them with little sense of perspective or deepened understanding.
Henkin's essay serves the basic purpose of framing the issues for
the remainder of the book. It clarifies that a meaningful discussion of
the state of human rights in contemporary China must begin with an
understanding not only of the legal systems of China and of the country
to which it is to be compared, but also of the cultural norms underlying
each of the societies being examined. It raises these issues, but does not
answer them.
The shortcomings in Henkin's work would be less obvious were it
placed after the concluding essay by Andrew Nathan. Nathan's discussion provides the specifics, both in the text and in the extensive notes to
Chinese and English sources, to support some of Henkin's generalities.
The difference between the pieces underscores one of the fundamental
weaknesses of the book: it is not so much a unified treatise on its subject
as a collection of essays which, while not outwardly conflicting, do not
blend to create a whole any greater than the sum of the parts.
Some of those parts, nevertheless, are useful, especially for the nonspecialist reader. The second of the four essays, Randle Edwards's
"Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today,"
provides an outline of the historical developments which have been the
backdrop for human rights progress in China, focusing on the changes
since the chaos of the decade-long Cultural Revolution. He notes the
4. For example, in a list of rights that "go without saying" in a "good and just
society," Henkin lists such rights as the right "to marry a person of one's choice, to
have or not to have children, to raise one's children by one's own lights." Id. at 15.
While these may be commendable goals, the extent to which they "go without saying" in the United States might be questioned in light of the volume of litigation on
these and similar subjects over the last two decades.
5. In yet another example of generalization, the devil's advocate might note
Henkin's emphasis that, "[fin one important respect the Chinese system clearly does
not satisfy the requirement that the will of the people be the basis of authority. For,
it is admitted, the people of China are not free to abandon socialism." Id. at 30. This
statement seems to presume knowledge about the amorphous "will of the people"
which is nowhere supported, other than by inference. How are the constitutional
provisions in China to this end to be distinguished from the provisions of U.S. law
which, to say the least, have "discouraged" Communism and Communists? It is true
that these and many other cavils focus on convenient summaries of conventional wisdom, but reiteration of such platitudes does little to advance a reasoned discussion of
human rights issues in China or elsewhere, nor does it provide a usefil framework
for future analysis.
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impact of the dramatic rise in the education of lawyers since then and
6
the growing public awareness of the roles that law can play in society.
The Edwards essay describes five themes touching on civil and
social rights in Chinese society and traces their evolution through both
provisions of written law and actual practice, based on personal interviews and published reports. His exposition of the role of societal values in Chinese legal development, including the disapproval of
litigation, the prevalence of negotiation and mediation, and a judicial
system implementing what he terms "a principle of nonfinality,"' 7 leads
to an appraisal of Chinese culture as one in which the "preferred place
[is] accorded to substantive justice over procedural justice. ' '8 The essay
further outlines debates among Chinese legal scholars and political factions about such rights as whether the right to post "big character" posters should remain in the Constitution. 9 These examples illuminate
principles behind the decisions and serve as reminders that it is not
accurate or useful to assume that there is a monolithic "Chinese,"
"Communist," "Maoist," or "Socialist" position on human rights. In
China, as elsewhere, theory and practice continue to evolve. The
Edwards essay briefly scrutinizes the status in China of the rights to life,
liberty, equality under the law, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, privacy and freedom of correspondence, family, honor and reputation, physical security, and so on, with short vignettes on such topics as
the lack of Chinese opposition to the death penalty, enforcement of the
family planning program, and the use of labor camps for "re-education." He concludes that the human rights situation in China "has basically improved over time" 10 and offers the hope that "individual rights
6. Some of those roles are the result of state efforts to promote orderly economic reforms; others seem to be the result of spontaneous expressions of the "will
of the people" to the extent that "will" can be discerned. One of the most interesting phenomena of the late 1980's and early 1990's in China may be the extent to
which the Chinese leadership might find that, in promoting the "rule of law," it has
opened a Pandora's box of possibilities for the populace. With the advent of an
administrative law which will permit citizens to sue the government, it will be intriguing to observe the directions taken in the implementation of the "rule of law" in the
near future.
7. Human Rights, supra note 1, at 47.
8. This conclusion, which may be surprising to those who assume that there is
little "justice" in socialist countries, puts into perspective the importance in China of,
for example, the confession of the accused. As Professor Edwards points out, it is not
simply a propaganda tool, but an integral part of the judicial proceedings. Id.
9. "Big character" posters (da zi bao) can be traced back to the use of wall posters by peasants to petition officials for redress in imperial times and were used by
revolutionaries before the establishment of the People's Republic. The right to post
da zi bao may be most familiar to Westerners from reports about 1979's "Democracy
Wall" in Beijing, when students covered a wall near central Beijing with posters urging greater political and intellectual freedom. See PekingPosters Point Fingerof Protestat
the Party, Fin. Times, June 17, 1988, § 1, at 4. Currently that right is not in the Chinese Constitution. Most recently, however, such posters have been seen mourning
the death of former Communist Party General Secretary, Hu Yaobang. Hit 's Death is
Stihing Unrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1989, at A38.
10. Human Rights, supra note 1, at 74.
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will grow as the economy develops and the country's leaders become
increasingly committed to the rule of law at home and in the international arena." I
The juxtaposition of continued economic reforms with hopes for
increased enjoyment of human rights presents a challenge for the Chinese leadership and people. While international respect is of some significance to China, bitter resentment of foreign "interference" is, as
Edwards notes, 12 equally characteristic. Given the rise in expectations
engendered by the economic reforms, and given the apparent rise in
crime in China, it is not necessarily clear that continued economic development will lead to increased enjoyment of individual human rights.
Perhaps the appropriate caveat is to hope that the Chinese economy
does, in fact, proceed to develop robustly. Even assuming the attainment of that not inconsiderable balancing act, the Chinese government
faces an onerous task in attempting to appease far greater and more
varied individual demands for freedoms of all types than have been contemplated to date.
The heart of the book follows the Edwards essay, in the form of two
essays by Andrew Nathan. The chapters on "Political Rights in Chinese
Constitutions" and "Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking" together
comprise nearly two-thirds of the book and are accompanied by some
three-fourths of the notes. The two essays provide an excellent synthesis of historical, cultural, and political factors forming the human rights
outlook in China today. The overwhelming impression left with the
reader, however, is that the final essay should have been the first essay in
this collection. Nathan eschews generalities and provides a brief yet
sophisticated exegesis of the development of political rights throughout
Chinese history. He focuses in greatest detail on the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries without neglecting the past or treating it as a five
thousand year-old unchanging whole.
His approach is less dogmatic than Professor Henkin's: he notes
the importance of scrutinizing both the theory and practice of rights and
acknowledges the vast gulf which may exist between any given document and the far more complex reality of the society which creates or
lives with the provisions of that document. He nevertheless manages to
paint a vivid picture of rights and repression, both legal and extra-legal,
using the analytical tool of comparison of eleven Chinese constitutions
of the twentieth century. The essay elaborates on a theme which Henkin
only alludes to, that of the distinction between the rights accorded to
"citizens" and those accorded to "people." Contrary to the intuitive
analysis of many Westerners, the "people" is actually the more restrictive of these two categories, carrying with it certain connotations of class
background and acceptable behavior.
11. Id. at 75.
12. Id. at 52-53.
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The Nathan essay also surveys the establishment of the hierarchical
system of people's congresses and the relationship between the party
and the state, following them from the early days of the People's Republic, as represented in the 1954 Constitution, to the acknowledgement in
1980 by the deputy chief of the Central Party School that "democracy is
a mere formality in our country."' 3 The essay provides substantial evidence of the extent to which internal debate has characterized these and
other legal and political developments in modern China, elaborating on
the "big character" poster debate mentioned by Edwards. Ironically, as
Nathan notes, the "da zi bao" were an instance of greater freedom during
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, which was withdrawn later.
Such an example epitomizes the need, when attempting to analyze
human rights in China, to monitor carefully and continuously one's use
of the terminology of "freedom" and "rights" and one's understanding
of the values attached to those terms in China and elsewhere.
Nathan's essay on political rights concludes with a series of characterizations of the state of human rights in China. He asserts that in
China, the state grants, withdraws, or changes rights; that rights derive
from citizenship, or from membership in the "people," rather than from
the fact of human personhood; that rights are seen as goals to be realized rather than as actually enjoyed; that laws may limit rights; and that
there is no effective procedure for independent review of the constitutionality of laws. Each of these conclusions is well supported with evidence drawn from the eleven surveyed constitutions and other sources,
the majority of them Chinese. These conclusions are then compared
with the United States situation and the differences are elucidated in
light of the legal and cultural traditions of the two countries. He effectively describes how the imported concept of a constitution has been
defined, refined, and interpreted over time in Chinese terms and has
contributed to a characteristically Chinese understanding of political
rights.
The final essay begins with the conclusions reached in the preceding essay and traces their background and development through Chinese philosophy and traditions. The depth of perspective this essay
offers recommends it to all readers, whether specialists in modern
China, in human rights, or simply those having an intellectual interest in
the subject. "Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking" lives up to its title by
sketching the origins and role of such concepts as individualism and
patriotism in the unfolding of thought about human rights in China. As
Nathan explains, even imported Western concepts such as individualism
were seen through the prism of Chinese patriotism in the mid-1800's.
The need to save China from the political and economic disarray of the
era was the essential quandary facing Chinese intellectuals of that era
and for nearly a century to follow.
In such a context it should not be surprising that concepts of indi13. Id. at 108.
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vidual rights were interpreted so as to "strengthen the state," 14 drawing
on both Western philosophies and the Confucian notion that correct
government rests on moral suasion. 15 Nathan clearly explains the
development of rights thinking from the late Qng dynasty, through the
periods of the republic, the Kuomintang, and the People's Republic, up to
and including the socialist democratic framework which sees the "procedural freedom of bourgeois democratic systems" as "illusory."' 16 Welfare rights are seen as the primary obligation of governments, with
political rights playing a far smaller role.' 7 In a poignant concluding
note, Nathan quotes Sun Yat-Sen's 1924 reference to China as a "sheet
of loose sand," where "too much liberty" led to weakness in the face of
foreign aggressors. 1 8 That image is so powerful that Deng Xiaoping
used it in 19801 9 and similar thoughts are often heard in China today.
Nevertheless, Nathan emphasizes that, in the Chinese tradition, the primary adversarial relationship in politics is not perceived as that of the
people and the leadership, but rather that of the people and the
20
bureaucracy.
Nathan's essay concludes with a thoughtful look at the future of
human rights development in China. He stresses that "[t]he more we
learn about the Chinese tradition, the less we can suppose that the tendencies of premodern Chinese thought were one-sidedly authoritarian" 2 ' and that "it is no longer possible to accept the myth that the
Chinese have no desire for individual rights."' 22 Nevertheless, he does
not shrink from acknowledging that "the gap between American and
Chinese democratic values ... is wide" 2 3 or from arguing that Western
individuals, governments, or organizations have standing to comment
on Chinese rights developments. 24 His argument is cogent and realistic;
he neither urges wholesale adoption of Western standards nor presents
rosy prognostications. His view of the future of human rights in China
postulates that
the idea of the supremacy of law is being reemphasized and may eventually become an entrenched part of the evolving Chinese concept of rights.
14. Id. at 148.
15. For further discussion of the role of intellectuals in Chinese society, see
CHINA'S INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP (M.
Goldman, T. Cheek & C. Hamrin eds. 1987), which describes Chinese intellectuals
historically as "feel[ing] responsible for the fate of their country," id. at 2, having an
"obligation . . .to remonstrate with tyrannical, arbitrary rulers," id. at 6, and "a
group with a special insight into the established moral norms." Id. at 7.
16. Human Righits, supra note I, at 147.
17. Id. at 153.
18. Id. at 157.
19. Id. at 159.
20. "Instead of a system of permanent conflict among divergent interests as in
the West, democracy was seen in China as a system of harmonization of diverse interests on the basis of their dominant common elements." Id. at 161.
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id. at 162.
24. Id. at 162-63.
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clearly defined. But
If this happens, the limits of rights may become more
25
they will not necessarily be significantly widened.
While this prediction may be less optimistic than those expressed in the
preceding essays in this book and elsewhere, it is firmly rooted in an
analysis which convincingly weaves together historical, political, and cul26
tural factors.

25. Human Rights supra note 1, at 134.
26. Recent news reports include submission of a petition to the Communist Party
leadership requesting amnesty for political prisoners, Washington Post, Feb. 17,
1989, at A35, col. 1; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China Daily Report,
Feb. 16, 1989, at 18; and the apparent rejection of that petition, Washington Post,
Feb. 23, 1989, at A22, col. 1. The U.S. government is taking an increased interest in
human rights in China as exemplified by President Bush's extension of an invitation
to leading dissident Fang Lizhi to a banquet in Beijing (which Prof. Fang was prevented from attending). Washington Post, Feb 23, 1989, at A22, col. 1. The Chinese
press continues to publish articles debating the purpose of the rule of law and considering such questions as "how can you change the law in accordance with the law?"
Sun Guohua, On Bringing Reforn Into the Orbit of the Rule of Law, Guangming Ribao,
Feb. 7, 1989, at 2, reprinted in translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
China Daily Report, Feb. 16, ,1989, at 19. Such developments can only be summed
up as continuing intellectual ferment; Nathan's analysis of their significance and possible ultimate direction is plausible and well-reasoned.

